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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT
People v. Willette 1
(decided July 12, 2007)
Tylor Willette was pulled over by a New York State Police K9 Unit for improper license plate illumination. 2 After the police dog
sniffed around the outside of Willette's automobile and indicated to
the trooper it smelled contraband, Willette's trunk was searched, revealing "approximately nine pounds of marijuana." 3 Willette was arrested and indicted for criminal possession of marijuana in the second
degree. 4 At trial, Willette sought to suppress the drugs and certain
statements he made on the grounds that they were obtained by an un5
lawful search and seizure under both the United States Constitution

and the New York State Constitution. 6 The trial court granted the
motion and dismissed the indictment. 7 On appeal, the Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed, holding that a warrantless "ca' 839 N.Y.S.2d 597 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2007).
2 People v. Willette, No. 4753, 2006 WL 3751118, at *1 (Essex County Ct. Sept. 22,

2006), rev'd, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
3 Willette, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
4 id.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV states, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ......
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 states, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ..
7 Willette, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
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nine sniff' conducted around the perimeter of a defendant's car does
not offend the state or federal constitutions. 8
Willette conceded the lawfulness of the initial traffic stop because of the improperly illuminated license plate. 9 The only question
was whether the subsequent canine sniff, which led to the search of
the defendant's trunk, was proper. After the traffic stop, the trooper
proceeded to routinely request the defendant's license and registration.10 Willette explained that his license was restricted to use for his
commute to and from work, and admitted he was not actually commuting during that particular trip.1" The trooper then returned to his
cruiser to run license and registration checks, and write up the violations: driving in violation of his restricted license; improper license
plate illumination; and illegally tinted windows. 12 The second time
the trooper approached Willette's car, he asked him to step out of the
vehicle, notified him that his canine partner would sniff around the
outside perimeter, and that he would conduct an inventory search; at
trial, he claimed to have smelled the scent of marijuana.'

3

In re-

sponse to the defendant's nervous reaction, the trooper asked him if
there was a problem, to which the defendant swore and then replied

8

Id. at 600.

9 Id. at 598.
10 Id.

11 Id.
12 Willette, 839 N.Y.S.2d 598.
"3 Willette, 2006 WL 3751118, at *2. The trooper's testimony was inconsistent and contradictory as to whether he smelled the marijuana before or after he began the search. While
it is undisputed that the officer did not tell the defendant that he smelled marijuana, it is unclear whether the officer informed the defendant of his intention to perform the inventory
search before or after the canine sniff. Id.
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"nine pounds." 14 The canine's behavior alerted the trooper to the
scent of drugs in the trunk, within which was a hockey bag contain15
ing sealed bags filled with marijuana.
The trial court concluded the search of Willette's vehicle violated his constitutional rights, reasoning the police officer had no
"reasonable grounds to believe the [d]efendant was guilty of a crime
rather than merely a traffic infraction." 16 Accordingly, both the canine sniff and inventory search exceeded the trooper's authority, and
all the evidence obtained pursuant to those searches was deemed "the
product of excessive detention [which] must be suppressed." 17 In
contrast, the appellate division concluded that the canine sniff and the
subsequent search of the trunk did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because it did not prolong the duration of the stop. 18 The court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police officer
to have probable cause before performing the canine sniff so long as
the initial traffic stop was lawful and the canine sniff was performed
contemporaneously with the trooper's originally lawful conduct. 19
That is, a canine sniff during a routine traffic stop does not per se run
afoul of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, so long as the detainment is independently lawful, the canine sniff alone will not infringe
on a person's Fourth Amendment rights.
14 Id. at 4-5.

Willette, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
t6 Willette, 2006 WL 3751118, at *4.
'5

17

id.

8 Willette, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 599. Because Willette could not legally drive the car away,

due to the commuting restrictions on his license, the car had to be towed and impounded.
Therefore, this traffic stop was, by its nature, significantly longer than an average traffic stop
and ticket issuance would normally last. Id.
19 Id.
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Furthermore, the Willette court determined that the canine
sniff did not amount to a search under the New York State Constitution.20 The court relied on the New York Court of Appeals' decision
in People v. Dunn,21 which focused on an individual's "reasonable
expectation of privacy" to determine whether a canine sniff would
constitute a search. 22 The Willette court reasoned that because the defendant was driving an automobile in violation of his license restrictions, thereby subjecting it to "impoundment and an inventory
search," any expectation of privacy was diminished to the extent that
the canine sniff did not amount to a search.23
In addressing the federal constitutional issue, the Willette
court relied on Illinois v. Caballes.24 In Caballes,the defendant was
stopped for speeding and while one officer was writing out a speeding ticket, a second officer had arbitrarily performed a canine sniff
search around his car.25 The search ultimately led to the discovery of
marijuana in the trunk and a criminal sentence that included a twelveyear period of imprisonment and a hefty fine. 26 The question presented to the Supreme Court was, "[w]hether the Fourth Amendment
requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drugdetection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop.

27

The Court held canine sniffs do not constitute a search under the

20

Id.

21 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990).
22

Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1058.

23 Willette, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
24

543 U.S. 405 (2005).

25 Caballes,543 U.S. at 406.
26 Id. at 407.
27

id.
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Fourth Amendment, and therefore do not require "reasonable, articulable suspicion. ' ,28 The Caballes holding is based on two precepts.
First, a traffic stop that is initially lawful must also continue to be
lawful for the duration of the seizure. 29 Second, a person in possession of contraband is afforded no Fourth Amendment protection with
respect to that item.3 °
The first precept has two parts: the initial basis for detainment must be lawful; and the duration of the detainment must not exceed its bounds.3'

In both Caballes and Willette, the initial detain-

ment was concededly lawful.

2

In both these cases the courts are

concerned instead with the continuing legality of the detainment.
Implicitly, the continuing legality of a lawful seizure could only be
disturbed by the violation of a protected right. In other words, the
continued detainment must correspond with its original basis.33 Thus,
the question becomes whether a canine sniff exceeds the legitimacy
of the stop. The Caballes Court addressed this issue by asserting the
second precept.
The second precept-that a person in possession of something
which he has no legal right to possess is afforded no Fourth Amend-

28 Id. at410.
29

See id. at 407. The court reasoned a seizure that begins lawfully can become unlawful

if it unreasonably infringes on a constitutionally protected interest. This would include situations in which the seizure carries on past a reasonable time necessary to accomplish its initial
aim. For example, a two hour traffic stop would be unlawful. Id.
30 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)
("[G]ovenmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband 'compromises no
legitimate privacy interest.'
31 See id. at 407.
32 Id.; Willette, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
33 Of course, an initial traffic stop may give rise to a new and independent basis for de-

tainment, which would then create its own legitimate bounds of detainment.
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ment protection with respect to that item-is derived in part from the
Court's application and extension of the decision in United States v.
Place.34 In Place, the Court dealt with the broader issue of whether
canine sniffs constitute "searches" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 35 The Court reasoned, "The Fourth Amendment 'protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy,' "36 focusing on the degree of expected privacy with respect to the area being searched. In Place,
Drug Enforcement Agency officials conducted a canine sniff of
Place's luggage after he landed at LaGuardia Airport. 37 Although acknowledging people have a legitimate expectation of privacy over the
contents of their personal luggage, the Court concluded that the nonintrusive nature of a canine sniff, disclosing only the presence or absence of something, makes it relatively unique; "[i]n these respects
the canine sniff is sui generis.,, 38 Because the canine sniff is limited
to the disclosure of contraband, without any other intrusion, no
Fourth Amendment rights are implicated.39
Thus, when the Court addressed the issue of whether a canine
sniff infringes upon the legality of an otherwise lawful traffic stop in

14 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
35 Place, 462 U.S. at 697-98.
36 Id. at 706-07 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977)).
37 Place,462 U.S. at 698-99.
38 Id. at 707 ("We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in
the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed .... ").
39 Id. See also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123. The Jacobsen Court reaffirmed the Place rationale by holding that no legitimate privacy expectation was compromised when a govern-

mental authority performed a "search" using a test that only revealed whether a substance is
cocaine and no other private fact; the test did not amount to a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss2/8
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Caballes, it concluded that it does not. Because a well-trained canine
discloses only the presence or absence of the smell of illicit material,
and "no other arguably 'private' fact,, 40 the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated, and it therefore does not affect an otherwise lawful traffic
stop. 41 Thus, although the Place Court articulated this rule in a nar-

row context, it has had broad application.42 Hence, in Place and, by
extension Caballes, a canine sniff is not generally considered a
search within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.
However, the dangers and shortcomings of the PlaceCaballes canine sniff rule are exemplified in Justice Souter's and Justice Ginsburg's rigorous dissenting opinions.43

The most obvious

danger that both Justices point out is the Orwellian quality of the
rule's application.44 Justice Souter argued Place's holding was based
on the notion that the canine sniff is sui generis, and that classifica-

40

Id. at 123.

41 Caballes,543 U.S. at 408.
42

Compare Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (holding a canine sniff performed on the defendant's

luggage for narcotics in a public airport did not offend Fourth Amendment rights), with Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123 (holding governmental conduct that only discloses contraband items
and "no other arguably 'private' fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest" and does
not infringe upon Fourth Amendment protections), and Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410 (holding
that the defendant, who had been pulled over for speeding, was legitimately subjected to a
canine sniff of his car).
41 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410-17 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); id. at 417-25 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
44 See, e.g., Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting).
[A]n uncritical adherence to Place would render the Fourth Amendment
indifferent to suspicionless and indiscriminate sweeps of cars in parking
garages and pedestrians on sidewalks; if a sniff is not preceded by a seizure subject to Fourth Amendment notice, it escapes Fourth Amendment
review entirely unless it is treated as a search.
See also id. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision... clears the way for suspicionless, dog-accompanied drug sweeps of parked cars along sidewalks and in parking lots..
. .Nor would motorists have constitutional grounds for complaint should police with dogs,
stationed at long traffic lights, circle cars waiting for the red signal to turn green." (internal
citations omitted)).
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tion in turn rested primarily on the assumption that canine sniffs are
infallible-that they expose only the presence or absence of contraband, without error. 45 Time, however, has proven this assumption to
be false. Numerous studies and statistics have shown that dog sniffs
do return false positives, 46 and thus "[t]he infallible dog... is a creature of legal fiction., 47 Hence, the argument posed in Place-that
because sniff dogs reveal only the presence or absence of illegal substances, the sniff does not infringe on legitimate privacy interests and
therefore should not be considered a search-is invalid.4 8 Logically
and realistically, canine sniffs are actually just searches that provide
police with information "about the contents of private spaces ....

",49

As such, "[i]t makes sense, then, to treat a sniff as the search that it
amounts to in practice, and to rely on the body of our Fourth
Amendment cases ...
ble."

in deciding whether such a search is reasona-

50

Justice Ginsburg argued the basis of the seizure and any ensuing searches should be reasonably related in scope to the purpose
of the initial detainment or investigation. 5 1 Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the Court has often applied Terry v. Ohio,52 to "indicate[]
that the limitation on 'scope' is not confined to the duration of the
45 Id. at 410 (Souter, J., dissenting).
46

Id. at 412 ("Indeed, a study cited by Illinois in [Caballes] for the proposition that dog

sniffs are generally reliable shows that dogs in artificial testing situations return false positives anywhere from 12.5 to 60% of the time .... (internal quotations omitted)).
41 Id. at411.
48 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 413.

50 Id. at414.
51 Id. at 419 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing application of stop-and-frisk standards

to canine sniff searches).
52 392 U.S. 1, 20, 27-28 (1968) (articulating stop-and-frisk standards).
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seizure; it also encompasses the manner in which the seizure is conducted., 53 Thus, in Caballes, though the canine sniff may not have
prolonged the stop is inconsequential, the focus should have been on
whether the canine sniff was "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference [traffic stop] in the first
place.

54

Accordingly, because the defendant was pulled over for

speeding but subjected to a canine sniff search for drugs, without any
probable cause or reasonable suspicion of narcotics, it impermissibly
broadened the scope of the investigation, such that it exceeded the
bounds of the police officer's authority and offended the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights.55
When comparing the merits of the arguments posed by the
majority and dissenting opinions in Caballes, it is clear which side is
stronger. The tenability of the notion that canine sniffs are a unique
form of search is paramount to the majority's position. However,
while Justice Souter refutes its plausibility with evidence and statistics proving its fallibility, the majority only alludes to the absence of
such evidence in the record.56 The majority also faults the defense
for not stipulating that it is the erroneous canine alert that is in and of
itself a Fourth Amendment infraction, and from this concludes the
canine alert actually provided probable cause to justify a complete
search of the defendant's trunk.57 However, this conclusion is erro-

51 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 419 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 420 (internal citation and quotations omitted).
51Id. at 420-21.
56 Id. at 409. But see id. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing case law supporting the fallibility of canine sniff alerts and citing to Petitioner's Reply Brief).
51 Id. of 409.
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neous, because it simply evades the issue; the issue remains the lawfulness of the use of the canine, not whether the canine alert established probable cause to search the trunk. Also, a failure to explicitly
argue the canine sniff is the actual cause of the Fourth Amendment
violation should not be dispositive; although it is not explicitly stated
in the record, it is implicit in the entire argument and the context of
the case.58
Interestingly, the disparity in strength between the majority's
position and Justice Souter's position,59 and the majority's erroneousyet-critical reliance on the premise that canine sniffs are unique in
their unobtrusiveness, is exemplified in their analysis of the precedent
established in Kyllo v. United States.60 In Kyllo, the United States
Supreme Court decided the issue of "whether the use of a thermalimaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect
relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."' 6

The defendant, Danny

Kyllo, was suspected of growing marijuana in his home. 62 Because
growing marijuana indoors typically requires the use of high-intensity
lamps, federal agents, without a warrant, used a thermal-imaging device to detect the various patterns and gradations of heat emanating

58 The issue framed by the majority is "[w]hether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a
legitimate traffic stop." Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407.

59 The majority's position is that canine sniffs are a unique form of unobtrusive search that
should be considered sui generis, while Justice Souter's position is that such a claim is un-

tenable and unsupported.
60 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
61 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29 (internal quotations omitted).
62 Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss2/8
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from the home.63 The scan detected suspiciously high levels of heat,
and based on those findings, the federal agents obtained a warrant to
search Kyllo's home, ultimately finding the marijuana plants they
suspected. 64 Kyllo moved to suppress the evidence seized on the
grounds the detection of heat waves by thermal imaging constituted a
warrantless search of his home and was unlawful.65 The lower courts
denied his motion.66 The Supreme Court, however, reversed and held
that because the thermal scanner used by the federal agents was not
the kind of technology generally available to the public, its use constituted the search of a home, and thus "is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." 67 Justice Souter recognized that the key to the
determination in Kyllo was the fact that the thermal-imaging device
was capable of revealing other lawful activity and legitimately private facts. He drew a direct analogy to Caballes-the drug-detection
dog is also a device, akin to the thermal-imaging device, which is not
in general public use and may obtain information not capable of being perceived by human senses, but is capable of revealing other private and lawful facts in the process. 68 On the other hand, the Caballes majority harmonized Kyllo by distinguishing information
about private items in the home from the contents of a vehicle's
trunk.69 Justice Souter drew a direct analogy to the precedent while

63 id.

64Id. at 30.
65 id.

U.S. at 30-3 1.
67 Id. at 40.
6 Caballes,543 U.S. at 413 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 409-10 (majority opinion). By arguing the lawful and private contents of a trunk
66 Kyllo, 533

are categorically distinct from those in the home, the majority essentially concedes that a ca-
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the majority finds it sufficient to assert that they are categorically different situations.
While Justice Souter's dissent attacked the majority opinion
on its own terms, Justice Ginsburg contended that the canine sniff
was unconstitutional regardless of its classification.

According to

Justice Ginsburg, a canine sniff conducted arbitrarily during a traffic
stop is unlawful not because of its potential to reveal legitimately private items, but because it broadens the scope of the "traffic-violationrelated seizure" to that of a drug investigation without any cause.7v
The majority simply discarded this argument, and concluded that
"conducting a dog sniff would not change the character of a traffic
stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner.

71

Given the Supreme Court's holding in Caballes, it is apparent
that the Willette court correctly held that the canine sniff of Willette's
car did not amount to a Fourth Amendment violation. The same cannot be said for the Willette court's state constitutional determination.
A careful look at the Willette court's reasoning casts suspicion on its
conclusion.

In its New York constitutional analysis, the Willette

court appropriately relied on the Court of Appeals' decision in People

nine sniff can disclose private and lawful facts. This appears to contradict the premise that
canine sniffs are substantially unobtrusive.
70 Id. at 420-22 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202,
205 (Ill.
2003) (quoting People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 281 (Il. 2002)) (holding that "a canine sniff... performed without 'specific and articulable facts' to support its use, unjustifiably enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation"); Willette, 2006
WL 3751118, at *4 (holding that "a defendant's nervousness alone does not provide a basis
for reasonable suspicion of criminality . . . [and], absent probable cause to believe criminality is afoot further detention of a motorist violates the motorist's constitutional rights").
7 Caballes,543 U.S. at 408.
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v. Dunn.72 In Dunn, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the use
of canines to detect drugs in a person's apartment falls within the
purview of the Fourth Amendment or the analogue under the New
York State Constitution.73

The court conceded, though there is a

heightened sense of personal privacy in one's home, there was still no
Fourth Amendment violation because the controlling factor under
Place is that the " 'canine sniff reveals only evidence of criminality," material to which an individual has no legitimate possessory
rights. y4 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals refused to adopt the
same rationale as a matter of state constitutional law. At the outset,
the court mentions that "in the past ...[it] has not hesitated to interpret article I, § 12 independently of its Federal counterpart when the
analysis adopted by the Supreme Court in a given area has threatened
to undercut the right of our citizens to be free from unreasonable
government intrusions.

75

The court first reasoned that "the fact that

a given investigative procedure can disclose only evidence of criminality should have little bearing on whether it constitutes a search.

76

The court explained, despite the non-intrusive and discriminate nature of the search, ultimately it reveals "the contents of a private
place.

77

Instead, the analysis should focus on whether the person

has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the area sought to be in-

72 564 N.E.2d at 1054.
73 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12; Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1055.
74 Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1056-57.
75 Id. at 1057 (citing People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985); People v. Gokey,
457 N.E.2d 723 (N.Y. 1983); People v. Johnson, 488 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 1985)).
76 Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1057.
77 Id.
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vaded by the search.78 As such, it is evident a canine sniff outside of
a person's apartment does constitute a search; "[t]o hold otherwise..
. would raise the specter of the police roaming indiscriminately
through the corridors of public housing projects with trained dogs in
search of drugs. Such an Orwellian notion would be repugnant under
our State Constitution.

79

Because the court determined the canine sniff was a search
under the New York Constitution, the court next addressed what degree of protection was warranted.8 ° Given that "a canine sniff is far
less intrusive than a full-blown search of a person's home," and its
great utility to the police force, the court concluded canine sniffs
should not be given the same level of protection as a "full-blown"
search. 8

However, because the scent originated from a private place,

and could only be detected through the use of a hyper-sensitive detection device (in this case, a trained canine's nose), a person can reasonably expect that the scent will not be exposed to a person of ordinary senses.82

Thus, the court compromised by weighing the

reasonable expectation of privacy people have over the contents of
their apartment against the significant utility of canine sniffs to law
enforcement. 83 Canine sniffs may be used without a warrant or probable cause, provided that the police have a reasonable suspicion a

78 The Court of Appeals' focus is on the "reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. at 1058.
The Caballes court focused on the "legitimate privacy interests." Caballes, 543 U.S. 409.
79 Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1057 (citing People v. Dunn, 553 N.Y.S.2d 257, 266 (App. Div.

4th Dep't 1990) (Lawton, J., concurring)).
80 Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1057.
81 See id. at 1058.
82 id.
83 Id.
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residence contains illicit contraband.84
Although Dunn requires a reasonable suspicion to perform a
canine sniff of a person's home, the Willette court recognized that the
Court of Appeals has not yet addressed the issue of canine sniffs with
respect to automobile searches.85 However, in People v. Price,86 the
Court of Appeals held a canine sniff of an airplane passenger's lug87
gage does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, the Willette court relied on Dunn and Price to define the two
extremes: "a sniff of luggage at an airport.
a sniff "outside of a person's residence

. .

.

." on the one hand, and

." on the other. The court

determined the search at hand fell somewhere in between. 88 The Willette court ultimately relied on People v. Yancy 89 in its decision. In
Yancy, the Court of Appeals explained:
Warrantless searches of automobiles are already recognized as an exception to the general rule that a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, given the mobility of the vehicle and the corresponding probability
that any contraband contained therein will quickly disappear, and the diminished expectation of privacy at84

Id.

85 Willette, 839 N.Y.S.2d. at 599.
86 431 N.E.2d 267 (N.Y. 1981).
87 Price, 431 N.E.2d at 269. Note that Price was decided nine years before Dunn and

Place. However, it is still good law and there is no reason to think that the Court of Appeals
would not reaffirm its decision were it presented with similar facts today. In Dunn, the court
noted that their focus in the Price decision was very unlike that of the Place Court.
[W]e, unlike the Place court, primarily focused on the reduced expectation of privacy that a person has with regard to the luggage he places in
the hands of a common carrier. Nowhere in Price did we even intimate
that the investigative tool employed there did not constitute a search because it could disclose only the presence or absence of contraband.
Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1057 (citations omitted).
88 Willette, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
89 654 N.E.2d 1233 (N.Y. 1995).
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tributed to individuals and their property when traveling in an automobile.9"
Based on this principle and because the defendant was driving
in violation of his restricted-use license, the Willette court concluded
that the defendant's expectation of privacy was lowered enough that a
canine sniff could be conducted without any reasonable suspicion. 91
The Willette court's analysis is questionable in the first instance because of its application of Yancy. The decision in Yancy
was highly fact specific. For example, the issue in Yancy was whether the arresting officer had probable cause to justify the warrantless
search of Yancy's car, not whether a warrantless search is justified
without any probable cause at all (the issue in Willette).92 The defendant in Yancy was stuck in gridlock traffic on his way into the Lincoln Tunnel, and was approached by a Port Authority officer directing traffic. 93 As the officer approached the car, he noticed an opened
bag in the passenger compartment appearing to contain vials of cocaine.94 The officer pulled the defendant's car over and proceeded to
question the defendant; the defendant responded with more incriminating statements. 95 The officer subsequently searched the defendant's car and discovered the incriminating evidence.96 The court
reasoned:
90 Yancy, 654 N.E.2d at 1236.

9' Willette, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 599-600.
92 Yancy, 654 N.E.2d at 1234.

93 Id. at 1235.
94 Id.

95 Id. Specifically, when the officer asked Yancy "what was in the bag," Yancy replied
"bottles," which the officer understood to be drug trade slang for vials of cocaine. Id.
96 Yancy, 654 N.E.2d at 1235.
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[T]he officers' incidental observation of hundreds of
separately packaged empty vials and caps in open
view following a valid automobile stop; the officers'
respective experience in narcotics investigation and
drug detection, which allowed them to surmise that
defendants possessed a large quantity of empty vials
for something other than personal use; and, each defendant's responses and conduct subsequent to the
stop for the traffic infraction provide evidentiary support for the . . . [findings] that there was probable
7
cause.

9

In contrast to Willette, the initial seizure in Yancy was due to
drug suspicion, and not a traffic violation. Furthermore, the contraband items were not concealed in the defendant's trunk, but were in
the back seat, in plain view. The search did not require a canine's
sensory perception. Moreover, the officer saw enough evidence to
establish probable cause, whereas in Willette the officer arguably did
not have any basis whatsoever to conduct the canine sniff.98

Al-

though the court in Willette only relies on Yancy to support the proposition that there is a reduced sense of privacy in an automobile, the
Willette holding suggests more: that an officer may lawfully, without
any basis, conduct a canine sniff during a routine traffic stop-a
proposition which is far removed from that which the court alluded to
in Yancy. The court draws a conclusion based on two very fact specific situations, which, although tenable, does not follow the Court of
Appeals' reasoning in Dunn.

9'

Id. at 1236.

98 See supra note 13

(noting how the trial court had serious doubts as to whether the offic-

er had even smelt any marijuana before he searched the vehicle).
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Juxtaposing Dunn with Caballes gives us an idea of how the
New York Court of Appeals would likely rule on the issue of canine
sniffs in the context of automobiles.

Comparing the reasoning in

Dunn with that of the Supreme Court in Caballes, it is clear that the
Dunn court takes a position akin to that of the Caballes dissenters.
Like Justice Souter, the Dunn court rejected the notion that canine
sniffs are sui generis; the court agreed that sniffs reveal the "contents
of a private place," and therefore subject it to Fourth Amendment restrictions. 99 As such, the Court of Appeals required at least a reason00
able suspicion to conduct a canine sniff of a person's residence.'
Moreover, although the Dunn court's reasoning differs from Justice
Ginsburg's, the result is exactly the same. In fact, because the court
requires an officer to have a reasonable suspicion as a basis for the
canine sniff, it inherently addresses Justice Ginsburg's concerns. Justice Ginsburg's argument goes to the issue of a canine sniff conducted with no basis at all, during a routine traffic stop.'0 ' When the
officer has a reasonable suspicion, the subsequent search is inherently
related in scope to that which the officer is suspecting.
Considering how the Dunn court's reasoning aligned with the
Caballes dissent, it is reasonable to conclude that in a gray area such
as that of Willette, the Court of Appeals would rule to safeguard protection from searches. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that
the Dunn court's primary concern was protection of its citizens from
99 Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1057.
'0o Id. at 1058 ("[Wie conclude that [a drug detection dog] may be used without a warrant
or probable cause, provided that the police have a reasonable suspicion that a residence contains illicit contraband.").
10' Caballes, 543 U.S. at420-21.
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unfettered governmental intrusion of their privacy.

Willette, was

pulled over for a routine traffic stop. Although he was violating restrictions on his license, thereby subjecting him to an inventory
search, there is no claim the officer had any reasonable basis to perform a canine sniff for drugs. This elicits the concerns of both Justices Ginsburg and Souter. Although the Willette court's reasoning focused on the defendant's reduced expectation of privacy, it never
addressed the issue of the officer's absence of reasonable suspicion to
perform the canine sniff. Is a reduced expectation of privacy alone
enough to justify a warrantless, suspicionless search?

Moreover,

without basing the sniff on reasonable suspicion, Justice Ginsburg's
concerns arise-the sniff exceeded the scope of the initial lawful seizure. The court does not address these points.

While the Willette

court explicitly left open the question of whether the New York Constitution ever requires a reasonable suspicion to conduct a canine
sniff search of automobiles, 10 2 its holding supports an answer in the
negative. The ruling in this case will inevitably be used to support
both propositions and thus, it may serve as a catalyst to bring the is10
sue before the Court of Appeals.

3

Mark Tsukerman

102
103

Willette, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
When the issue does come before the Court of Appeals, it will not be via Willette.

People v. Willette, 874 N.E.2d 762 (N.Y. 2007) (denying leave to appeal).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

19

Touro Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 [2014], Art. 8

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss2/8

20

